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Guthrie: Guthrie: Procedural Justice Research

Procedural Justice Research
and the
Paucity of Trials
Chris Guthrie*
Professor Deborah Hensler tells an important cautionary tale about mandatory
mediation in her thoughtful and provocative contribution to this volume. In Suppose
It's Not True: ChallengingMediation Ideology,' Hensler observes that courts are
now requiring litigants to mediate civil cases "on the grounds that litigants prefer
[mediation] to traditional litigation,"2 yet there is "a long line of social psychological
research on individuals' evaluations of different dispute resolution procedures"
consistent with the "idea that litigants might prefer adversarial litigation and
adjudication" to mediation.' Hensler acknowledges that "some experimental
research has found that subjects prefer mediation,"4 but she argues that "the
empirical work to date [does not] provide strong support for the notion that civil
disputants prefer mediation to adversarial litigation and adjudication."'
Hensler's contention that litigants might prefer adversarial adjudication to other
forms of dispute resolution6 is based on a defensible interpretation of the existing
"procedural justice" research; in my view, however, the existing procedural justice
research is of limited applicability to the mandatory mediation debate because it
speaks primarily to litigants' assessments of trial, not litigation. Consider, for
example, the three primary studies upon which Hensler builds her argument.' In the
initial Thibaut and Walker study she cites, the researchers found that subjects
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1. Deborah R. Hensler, Suppose It's Not True: Challenging MediationIdeology, 2002 J. Dis. Res.
81 (2002).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 91. See Robert Peirce, Dean Pruitt & Sally Cazja, Complainant-RespondentDifferences in
Procedural Choice, 4 Intl. J. Conflict Mgmt. 199,200-02 (1993).
5. Hensler, supra n. 1,at 91.
6. The early research compared litigant and observer responses to an "adversarial" process like that
used in American courts and an "inquisitorial" process like that used in much of Europe. See e.g.
Laurens Walker et al., Reactions of Participantsand Observers to Modes of Adjudication, 4 J. Applied
Soc. Psychol. 295 (1974). An inquisitorial process is "a more cooperative model of adjudication where
evidence is either developed by the decision-maker, or, in its modified form, is presented to the judge
by one investigator who is not aligned with either party." Id. at 296-97.
7. Hensler relies primarily on what she describes as the "first generation" of procedural justice
research to construct her mandatory mediation argument. Hensler, supran. i, at 93_. She believes the
more recent procedural justice research speaks with less clarity on this issue. Id. ("The implications of
more recent research focusing on why perceived procedural fairness matters for choices between dispute
resolution procedures is more ambiguous.") (emphasis in original).
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preferred an adversarial trial to an inquisitorial trial In a follow-up Thibaut and
Walker study, the researchers evaluated subjects' ex ante assessments of negotiation,
mediation (actually non-binding arbitration), a "moot", arbitration, and autocratic
decision-making. 9 And in a "real-world" study conducted by Hensler and her
colleagues,'" the researchers compared litigants' ex post assessments of trial,
arbitration, and judicial settlement conferences to settlement, finding that subjects
rated trial and arbitration more favorably than settlement but settlement more
favorably than judicial settlement conferences." These and other procedural justice
studies suggest that people like trialmore than the mediation community would have
us believe, 2 but they do not provide much insight into the way people perceive the
pre-trial litigation processes likely to resolve their disputes."
This, it seems to me, is the key procedural justice question for the mandatory
mediation debate. In a system where a tiny fraction of cases is actually tried, what
matters most is not how litigants rate mediation relative to trial but how they rate
mediation relative to the litigationprocesses that are actually likely to lead to the
resolution of the dispute. Data from federal and state courts show that litigants are
likely to resolve their disputes not through trials on the merits but rather through pretrial motions or settlement.'4 In fiscal year 2000, for example, the federal district
courts "terminated" 259,637 civil cases. 5 Only 3,131 (or 1.2%) of these culminated
in a jury verdict and 1,532 (or .6%) in a bench verdict. 6 Of the 98.2 percent of cases
that did not culminate in a trial verdict, most were resolved through: (1) dismissals
for lack of jurisdiction, voluntary dismissals, settlements, or other dismissals

8. See Walker et al., supra n. 6. For Hensler's description of this study, see Hensler, supra n. 1, at

85-86.
9. Pauline Houlden et al., Preferencefor Modes of Dispute Resolution as a Function of Processand
Decision Control,14 J. Exper. Soc. Psychol. 13, at 14-15 (1978). For Hensler's description of this study,
see Hensler, supra n. 1, at 86-88.
10. E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants'Evaluations of TheirExperiences
in the CivilJusticeSystem, 24 Law & Society Rev. 953 (1990). For Hensler's description of this study,
see Hensler, supran. 1, at 88-89.
1-1. Lind etal.,supran. 10, at965.
12. See Hensler, supran. 1, at 89 (observing that litigants in the Lind study "liked trials") (emphasis
in original).
13. Some of this research does compare trial to settlement, which is, of course, one common means
of resolving disputes prior to trial. See e.g. Lind, supra n. 10; John Thibaut et al., Procedural Justice
as Fairness, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 1271 (1974).
14. See e.g. Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994
Wis. L. Rev. 631, 632-33 ("Civil process based on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has largely
replaced trials with motions.").
15. 1 obtained these data from the "Judicial Statistical Inquiry Form" maintained by Cornell Law
Professors Theodore Eisenberg and Kevin Clermont. Relying on data originally collected by the

Administrative Office of the United States Courts, assembled by the Federal Judicial Center, and
disseminated by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, Eisenberg and
Clermont have constructed a searchable database containing roughly five million federal civil cases
terminated during the last two decades or so. See <http://teddy.law.comell.edu:8090/questata.htm>
(accessed Jan. 21, 2002).
16. Id.
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(53.3%);" (2) transfers to other courts, remands to state court, judgments on award
of arbitrators, trials de novo following arbitration judgments, or other judgments
(18.5%);" 8 (3) pretrial motions (12.8%); 9 or (4) default judgments (8.2%).20 These
fiscal year 2000 data are consistent with federal court data from prior years 2 1 as well
as available state court data.'
The purpose of this response is not to criticize the procedural justice literature
for ignoring the way people experience (or anticipate experiencing) pre-trial
litigation processes. Procedural justice researchers have been motivated by different
questions - for example, understanding how people respond to legal authority and
make fairness judgments' - and have generated valuable answers to these questions
- for example, people make judgments about the fairness of a process independent
of the outcomes they obtain.'
Nonetheless, this response does identify a set of questions ripe for procedural
justice research. How do litigants evaluate the processes by which disputes are
typically resolved in the civil justice system? In the (as many as) thirty-five percent
of cases resolved by motions to dismiss or summary judgmentas do the litigants
respond as favorably to the motion process as to trial? Are their evaluations of the
fairness of the process more (or less) influenced by the outcome of the motion? Do
plaintiffs and defendants respond differently? Do the litigants react the same way
regardless of whether the judge holds hearings on the motions? Do they rate the
process more favorably when the judge issues a written opinion? How do litigants
compare disposition by motion to evaluative mediation or facilitative mediation?
How do they rate mediation relative to settlement? Do they like consensual

17. Coded as "othdismi" by the researchers. Id.
18. Coded as "other"by the researchers. Id.

19. Coded as "prermnot" by the researchers. Id.
20. Coded as "defaulti" by the researchers. Id.
21. According to the Eisenberg/Clermont database, 1.9% of the federal cases resulted in a trial verdict
in 1999, 2.2% in 1998, 2.4% in 1997, 2.4% in 1996, and 2.7% in 1995. Id. See also Judith Resnik,
Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 494, 511-12 (1986) (citing an
estimate by an employee of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts that "some 35 percent
of all federal cases are disposed of by rulings on motions for dismissal or for summary judgment").
22. Eisenberg and Clermont also maintain a database containing information on a sample of state trial
court cases taken from forty-five of the country's most heavily populated counties. See
<http://teddy.law.cornell.edu:8090/questtrs.htm> (accessed January 22,2002). Of the 29,880 cases in
their sample completed in 1992, 650 (2.18%) culminated in a jury trial and 378 (1.27%) in a bench trial.
Id. Most cases were resolved through settlements, motions, and defaults. Id. See also Herbert M.
Kritzer, Adjudication to Settlement: Shading in the Gray, 70 Judicature 161, 163 (1986) (finding in an
initial analysis of 1,649 randomly selected state and federal cases that only seven percent were tried).
23. See e.g. Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice, in Handbook of Justice Research in
Law 65 (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds., Kluwer Academic/Plenum Pub. 2001).
24. For Hensler's discussion of this finding and supporting citations, see Hensler, supra n. 1, at 8990.
25. See Resnik, supra n. 21, at 511-12.
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processes such as settlement and mediation better when they are active participants,
passive participants, or entirely absent? And so on.'
Likewise, I do not mean to criticize Hensler's contribution to this volume.
Although she is a prominent proceduraljustice researcher herself, she is certainly not
responsible for the inattention given to the questions I have identified, and her
measured conclusions about what might be inferred from the existing research are
certainly appropriate. Indeed, I take Hensler' s broader point to be that courts should
not mandate mediation simply because they believe as a matter of faith that
mediation is a "better" process than others." Rather, courts should base their
decisions, to the extent possible, on empirical evidence about the relative
desirability, fairness, and legitimacy of the available dispute resolution processes.
This seems quite sensible.

26. Hensler makes the intriguing and intuitively plausible suggestion that "people want neutral third
parties to resolve their disputes on the basis ofthefacts." Hensler, supra n. 1, at 94. Assuming so, how
do litigants evaluate resolutions based on dispositive motions where the facts are assumed for purposes
of argument? Is this akin to the presentation of facts at trial, or is this treatment of "facts" likely to be
less satisfying to litigants?
27. Nor, according to Hensler, should courts base their decisions on outcome studies that assess
litigant satisfaction with mediation alone. Id.at 82 ("Litigant satisfaction surveys conducted after people
had experienced an ADR procedure were the primary tools that courts used to assess consequences, and
generally they found that litigants surveyed were more 'satisfied' than 'dissatisfied.' But knowing that
litigants are 'satisfied' with mediation tells us little about preferences for mediation - litigants might be
even more satisfied with a different procedure if it were offered to them.").
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